

CONFIGURATION SCRUBBING AND MITIGATION APPROACHES FOR THE ZYNQ SYSTEM-ON-CHIP

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


SEFUW: Space FPGA Users Workshop, March 2016

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

Zynq All-Programmable SOC

- Processor Resources
 - Dual ARM A9 cores
 - NEON FPU Engine
 - L1/L2 Cache + Shared Memory (OCM)
- I/O Resources
 - SPI, I²C, CAN, UART, Flash, USB, GPIO, GigE, etc.
 - PCIe, DDR controller
- Programmable Logic
 - 350K logic cells
 - 545 BRAM (36 Kb blocks)
 - 900 DSP slices
 - 350 I/O pins



CHREC Space Processor (CSP)

- Zynq-Based CubeSat Processing board
 - *Developed at University of Florida, CHREC*
 - *1U CubeSat form factor – 10cm x 10cm*
 - *Hybrid COTS/RadHard device support*



- COTS
 - Zynq-7020 hybrid SoC
 - *Dual ARM A9/Neon cores*
 - *Artix-7 FPGA fabric + hard IP*
 - DDR3 memory
- RadHard
 - NAND flash
 - Power circuit
 - Reset circuit
 - Watchdog unit

"CSP: A Multifaceted Hybrid Architecture for Space Computing", Proc. of the AIAA/USU Conf. on Small Satellites, Logan, UT, Aug. 2-7, 2014.


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CSP Scheduled Deployment




NASA technology mission:
STP-H5/ISEM on ISS

- Two CSPv1's working in tandem
- SpaceWire, camera
- Reconfiguration control
- Anticipate launch: imminent



NASA science mission:
CeREs Cubesat

- Heliophysics experiment in LEO orbit
- One CSPv1 computer for on-board data processing





NASA Undergraduate student
Instrumentation Project (USIP):
BYU Passive Inspection CubeSat
(PICS)

- Passive spacecraft inspection
- Spherical camera (6 faces)
 - Data logging, compression
- CSP controls camera & power system
- Command and control
- Anticipated launch: Dec 2017

SEU Mitigation Techniques

- FPGA
 - Triple Modular Redundancy
 - **Configuration Scrubbing**
 - ECC/Memory Scrubbing
- Processor (Linux O/S)
 - Hardware watchdog timer
 - DDR ECC enabled (SECDED)
 - Memory scrubbing
 - Active cache management




Most failures are due to memory system

Demo Tonight: TMR and Fault Injection


Wednesday Presentation: BL-TMR Tools and Results

Configuration Scrubbing

- Configuration memory should remain static
- Upsets in configuration *change* design
- Repair mechanism needed for configuration upsets
 - Return configuration memory to original state
 - Process called "configuration scrubbing"
- Configuration Scrubbing Responsibilities
 - Periodically check the memory to detect upsets
 - Overwrite (correct) those locations in memory where upsets are detected
- Many approaches for configuration scrubbing
 - Blind Scrubbing
 - Readback Scrubbing
 - Hybrid Scrubbing
 - External vs. Internal Scrubbing




Scrubbing Example




Configuration Interfaces

- Configuration scrubbing performed using *configuration Interfaces*
 - *Interface for loading configuration data*
 - *Read configuration data (readback)*
- Available Configuration Interfaces
 - *JTAG – serial external I/F*
 - *ICAP – parallel internal I/F*
 - *SelectMap* – parallel external I/F*
 - *PCAP – processor internal I/F*



*Not available on Zynq devices

Processor Config Access Port (PCAP)



PCAP DMA Bridge

- Accessible from the Zynq processor
 - AXI Bridge/DMA Interface
 - Transfer data between DDR and FPGA
 - Interrupt Support
- Configuration Operations
 - DMA transactions
 - Setup DMA registers
 - Issue DMA transfer
 - Configuration
 - Write to TxFIFO
 - Readback
 - Read from RxFIFO





Figure 6-14: AXI-PCAP Bridge


PCAP Requirements

- Atomic operations
 - All configuration operations handled in one DMA transfer
 - Must manage DMA controller carefully
- Readback
 - Sufficient bandwidth to capture readback data
 - Break up into smaller readback packets
 - Manage PCAP Clock




7-Series Internal Scan

- Automatically detect and correct SEUs
 - *Internal hardware implements SECDED*
 - *Continually reads configuration frames*
 - *Fast detection and correction speeds*
- Exploits the FrameECC interface
 - *Decodes Frame ECC word*
 - *Detects double errors*
 - *Identifies location of single errors (repair)*
- Limitations
 - *Cannot correct multi-bit upsets (MBUs)*
 - *May insert errors when repairing odd upsets*
 - 3 or more upsets (3,5,7, etc.)
 - *May try to repair upsets in "empty" location*
 - "Out of bounds" upset, "masked" bits
- Global CRC: Used to detect global bitstream errors




Incorrect Scrub Examples


Odd (3+)
MBU




Readback
CRC
Incorrect
Repair




Odd (3+)
MBU




Odd (3+) MBU
(Out of Bounds
Repair)



Odd (3+)
MBU




Masked
Bit
Repaired



Hybrid Scrubbing


- Combine benefits of multiple approaches
 - *Internal Scan: High Speed*
 - *External Scrub: Correct MBUs*

	SBU's	MBUs
Detection	RCRC	RCRC
Correction	RCRC	External Scrubber



FRAME_ECC Packet Logging

- Error condition can be inferred from error signals
- Log error events
 - *syndrome_valid*
 - *Non-zero syndrome*
- History of error packets needed to determine error type




Error Event Types

- SBU and Odd-Numbered "In Bounds"
 - *First packet detects upset*
 - *Second packet fixes upset*
- Odd Numbered "out of bounds"
 - *First packet detects upset*
 - *Second tries to fix upset*
 - *Continuous upset packets (since it can't be fixed)*
- Even numbered/Masked bits
 - *First packet detects upset*
 - *Continues to generate packets (since it isn't fixed)*


Type of Upset	FRAME_ECCE2 Batches Generated
SBU	2
Even-Numbered MBU	∞
Odd-Numbered In-Bounds MBU	2
Odd-Numbered Out-of-Bounds MBU	∞
Odd MBU Correction at Masked Bit	∞

Hybrid Scrubber Flowchart




Example


Good
Memory




Radiation
Upset



Odd
MBU




Readback
CRC
Incorrect
Repair



Readback
Scrubber
Fixes All
Upsets




Good
Memory
Restored



Odd In-Bounds Multi-Bit Upset

Radiation Beam Test Setup

- Radiation Tests
 - *Neutrons*
 - *Protons*
 - *Heavy-Ions*
- Facilities
 - *TRIUMF (Neutrons)*
 - *LANSCCE (Neutrons)*
 - *TSL (Protons)*



Hybrid Scrubber Log Excerpt

Frame_ECC 0: 8B21176B

Frame_ECC 1: 60400A9C

13176.651231 : SBU corrected @ FRAD: 400A9C Word: 33 Bit: 11

13176.742754 : CRC HIGH: Multi-Bit Upset! Syndrome: 1

13176.776186 : Scrubbing FRAD: 400A9D...

13176.776914 : FAULT DETECTED! FRAD: 400A9D Word: 33 Bit(s): 10 11

13176.777756 : Word: 33 | Expected: 0 Actual: C00

13176.782169 : Scrubbing of FRAD: 400A9D Finished with 2 Upsets !

Clearing CRC latch ! After Scrub, CRC = 0

Test Results—Hybrid Scrubber

Number of Upsets in a Frame	Occurrences
1	4,239
2	326
3	133
4	41
5	3
6	7
7	2
8	1
14	1
16	1
Total Upsets Corrected	5,563
Readbacks	69
Reboots	281
Even → Odd Upset Scenario	71
Odd out-of-bounds Upsets	0
Masked Bit Upsets	0
Total Runtime	152,168.03 seconds

Performance—Hybrid Scrubber*

Upset Type	Detection	Correction	Total Scrubbing
SBU	8.02 ms	4.5 us	8.024 ms
Two-Bit	8.02 ms	1.86 ms	13.38 ms
Odd MBUs	16.04 ms	1.86 ms	21.40 ms
Even MBUs	8.02 ms	1.86 ms	13.38 ms
Full Readback Scrub	1.82 s	1.86 ms	1.822 s

*all measurements performed on xzc07020 board

Questions?

"Xilinx 7-Series Configuration Scrubbing Architectures for High-Reliability FPGA Systems ", Aaron Stoddard, MS Thesis, Brigham Young University, December 2015