

Spacecraft electrical passivation Overview

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European Space Agency



Background

Among 240 accidental inorbit break-ups of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages recorded from 1957 to May 2014 (ESA DISCOS), about 3% are due to battery



At least 9 spacecraft broke-up due to battery:

- 1. Cosmos 839 (USSR), 29/09/1977
- 2. Ekran-2 (USSR), 25/06/1978 (first known fragmentation in GEO)
- 3. Cosmos 880 (USSR), 27/11/1978
- 4. Cosmos 1275 (USSR), 24/07/1981
- 5. Cosmos 1375 (USSR), 21/10/1985
- 6. Cosmos 1691 (USSR), 22/11/1985 (NiH₂)
- 7. NOAA 8 (USA), 30/12/1985 (caused by battery overcharge)
- 8. Cosmos 1823 (USSR), 17/12/1987 (NiH₂)
- 9. DMSP-F13 (USA), 03/02/2015 (Ni-Cd)

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Specifications and guidelines



For European spacecraft:

- ECSS-U-AS-10C, 10/02/2012 "Space Sustainability, Space debris mitigation requirements"
 - → **ISO** 24113, Second Edition, 15/05/2011 "Space Systems, Space Debris Mitigation Requirements"
- ESA/ADMIN/IPOL(2014)2, 28/03/2014 "Space Debris Mitigation for Agency Projects" → ECSS → ISO
- "ESA space debris mitigation compliance verification guidelines", ESSB-HB-U-002-Issue1, 19/02/2015
- French space operations law (LOS), law 3/6/2008, decree 9/6/2009, bylaw 31/3/2011
- **CNES guidelines**, RNC-LOS-GR-CNF-8-CNES, version 2,
- 24/03/2014, « Guide des bonnes pratiques maîtrise d'un object spatial »

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Roadmap



CleanSpace Electrical Passivation Roadmap



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ESA internal activity completed in 2014

Analysis after 15y operational + 25y disposal = 40y, considering loss of spacecraft control in LEO, MEO or GEO

Focus on:

- Thermal analysis
- Radiation analysis
- Micrometeoroid / Debris analysis





- Activity lead by RUAG Finland with Airbus DS
- Objective: study, implement and evaluate most adequate means to ensure proper and reliable spacecraft power system passivation at end of mission
- **Phase 1** (completed):





Battery safety analysis after EoM

- Despite various cell protections, the speed of the thermal runaway reaction may be too high for the protections to react in time in some cases and the risk of breakup cannot be completely excluded
- **Recommendations** to keep battery in safe conditions:
 - **Discharge** battery as low as possible (50% SoC or lower)
 - □ Avoid high temperature (< 100° C)
 - Prevent recharging of the battery and in particular avoid overcharging
 - Passivation device shall sustain the harsh environment after passivation





Potential implementations

- Most promising solutions according to ranking:
 - Battery disconnection by relay or by-pass switch and discharge by resistor
 - Solar array disconnection by relays
 - Solar array short-circuit by relays via diodes
- In addition following options promising when combined or in particular cases:
 - Adapting s/c configuration or attitude (e.g. spinning)
 - Decrease of battery charge voltage/current
 - Over-discharge the battery to OV
 - Battery containment for cubesat
 - Use battery bypass switches to disconnect battery

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Main recommendations

- System: perform thermal and radiation analyses after disposal to check impact on battery and passivation device (PCDU)
- Battery: keep discharged as low as possible and avoid high temperature
- Components used for passivation: privilege (electro-) mechanical devices such as relays or by-pass switches



- 1. Toolbox document describing in detail most interesting solutions
- 2. Evaluate and test components to be used for passivation:

Relays

- Semiconductors (Mosfet, diode)
- By-pass switch

Thermal cycling, life test, functional tests



R&D activities TRP Battery Passivation



- Activity lead by Airbus DS with Saft, ABSL and CEA
- Objective: **test** Li-Ion battery cells and modules under extreme conditions encountered after spacecraft disposal
- Both fresh and aged (cycled and irradiated) cells: ABSL18650-HC,-HCM, -NL & Saft VES16, VES140, VES180
- Tests:
 - External short-circuit
 - □ Internal short-circuit (nail test)
 - Over-charge
 - □ Over-discharge (to 0.5V/cell, 0V, -0.8V, followed by cycling)
 - □ Accelerating Rate Calorimetry (ARC) test (at various SoC)
 - Over-temperature test
 - Micrometeoroid/debris impact test

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R&D activities CleanSat activities



Jointly managed by 3 main European primes (Airbus, TAS, OHB)

1. Battery safety (ABSL)

- Analysis of battery safety after EoM
- Recommendations provided for battery conditions after EoM
- List of qualification tests related to safety after EoM
- 2. Solar array disconnection (Leonardo):
 - Trade-off of various solar array disconnection solutions
 Selected concept: short-circuit each SA section by relay(s) in dedicated modules to be included in PCDU
- 3. Passivation of solar array in PCDU (TAS Belgium):
 - Trade-off of various solar array disconnection solutions
 - Selected concept: SAR with isolated DC/DC converter and use of galvanic isolation of transformer to achieve passivation

R&D activities Upcoming GSTP activities



1. Electrical Passivation – PCDU upgrade for power passivation (700k€, 24 months)

- Follow-up previous CleanSat activities
- Technological tests and elegant breadboard

2. Battery Passivation – Safety Testing (250k€, 18 months)

- Follow-up previous CleanSat activity
- Complement of TRP



Implementation on real missions





+ environmental analysis during disposal phase

+ detailed EoM operations procedure

Implementation on real missions



Example



Figure 1. LEO PCDU EVO Solar Array Passivation

Credit: Airbus DS, ESPC 2016

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Implementation on real missions

Example GEO telecom satellite Battery ps configuration with bypass switch







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Perspectives for the future



It is expected that more and more spacecraft will implement electrical passivation from now on

Main planned activities:

- Tests on batteries (cells and modules) to assess their safety during disposal phase
 → via ongoing TRP activity and/or upcoming GSTP activity
- Tests on components used for passivation to assess their robustness under extreme conditions and/or extended lifetime → via ongoing GSTP phase 2
- **Development of optimal integrated designs** and operations to achieve passivation

→ via new upcoming GSTP activity and implementation on ongoing/future projects

Thank you for your attention