HASDEL

Final Presentation Days Tuesday, 09 December 2014

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AIRBUS DEFENCE & SPACE

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Hardware Software Dependability for Launchers

RNTHAACHEN UNIVERSITY

Agenda



Introduction – Objectives of the HASDEL project

- The HASDEL approach
- Use cases
 - Equipment reintegration
 - ATV data handling system architecture
- Demonstration
- Conclusion





Objectives of the HASDEL project

Objectives

- Analysing the specific needs of launcher systems in the domain of RAMS (*Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety*) analysis
- Extending the COMPASS toolset with these specific needs



Launchers and space transportation vehicles specificities

- High level of criticality
- Hard real time requirements
- Functional complexity
- RAMS requirement complexity (e.g. management of redundancies)







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09/12/2014 p4

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The HASDEL Approach: Flow



09/12/2014 p7

The HASDEL Toolset

Comprehensive toolset

- Modelling in SLIM, a variant of SAADL
- Implementing the V&V flow and analyses illustrated in previous slides
- Based on state-of-the-art model checking tools







09/12/2014 p8

SLIM language

HASDEL enables modelling of:

- Behaviour using modes and states
- Data shared by connections and flows
- Timed/hybrid dynamics using clocks and continuous variables



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SLIM: Timed Failure models

An example: modelling error propagation

- First transition with probabilistic rate
- Next transition with time delay



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Fault injections

Nominal and failure models are coupled by fault injections

	Error Model	
Implementation:	equipment::gpsError.i	~
State:	permanent_failure	~
	Nominal Model	
Instance:	gps4.gps	~
Data element:	measurement	~
Effect:	False	

"When the error state is permanent_failure, gps.measurement becomes false"





Timed Property Patterns

HASDEL enables modelling of properties via instantiation of property patterns

Classes of property patterns

- Functional pat
 - E.g., absenc
- Timed patterns
 - E.g. absence
- Probabilistic p
 - E.g., probabi Time2 with p

711	Categories	Patterns	
Gl	All	propositional	
	Propositional	absenceGlobal	
	Functional	existenceGlobal	
	Timed	universalityGlobal	
	Probabilistic	precedenceGlobal	ne units"
++~		responseGlobal	
lle		responseExist	
stic	Pattern Story		tween Time1 and
be	The atomic proposition dpu.co	md always holds.	
	Description: Correctness	🔗 Discard 🛛 🖋 Con	firm



Timed Failure Propagation Graphs (TFPGs)

- Graph-like formalism to describe failure propagation
 - Faults
 - Interaction between different faults (AND/OR semantics)
 - Propagation delays (time intervals)
 - Context information (system modes)
 - Effects of fault propagation (discrepancies)
 - Observability (monitored and non-monitored discrepancies)
- TFPGs can be used for diagnosis and prognosis
- TFPG analyses supported by HASDEL
 - Validation of a TFPG with respect to a system model
 - Validation of TFPG as a model for diagnosis
 - Automatic synthesis of a TFPG from a system model





An Example TFPG



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Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR)

Diagnosis system

- Plant (Physical Device) in closed loop with a controller
- Control is responsible for commanding actuators
- Diagnosis tracks the hidden state of the plant over time

Partial observability

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 Only a limited number of observables (sensors) are available





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Timed FDIR Analyses

Timed Diagnosability Analysis

- Check if there exists a diagnoser that can infer at run-time accurate and sufficient information to diagnose system properties (e.g., occurrence of faults)
- It helps identifying if enough observables are available for building an FDIR sub-system
- E.g.: "fault F is diagnosable within T time units"
- Timed FDIR effectiveness analysis
 - Check the effectiveness of an existing FDIR sub-system
 - Fault detection, fault isolation and fault recovery analyses
 - E.g.: "fault F can be detected by the FDIR sub-system within T time units"



Probabilistic risk analysis

Performability analysis

 Investigate model reliability

Numerical analysis

 Based on Markov Chain model checking



Statistical analysis

 Based on Monte Carlo method



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Fault Tree analysis

Supports Fault Tree generation and evaluation



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Equipment reintegration



09/12/2014 p20

Equipment reintegration modelling principle



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Agenda



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ATV data handling system architecture



Fault Tolerant Computer model



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Properties

Property type	Property description
expectedTime	"The expected time to reach a state where the proposition <i>not failure</i> holds."
IongRunAverage	"The long-run average time spent in states where the proposition <i>not failure</i> holds."
probabilisticInvariance	"The probability that <i>not failure</i> holds continuously within timebound [<i>0 min</i> , <i>2 min</i>]"



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09/12/2014 p26



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The sensor provides correct measurement





09/12/2014 p28

Electrical view



Error view

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IHM

Random simulation

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Name	Simulation Checking Checking Analysis D	ivergence										
	Model extended by Fault injections											
	Random 🗸 🕑 Run	Length: 10	۵ ا) Restart (Fa	ailu	re o	occi	ırre	nce	•
	✓ Simulation											
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	- gps1 activated			====								
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Simulation guided by transitions

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Properties Name	Model Deadlock Model Zeno Time Simulation Checking Checking Analysis Divergence		
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	✓ Simulation	has to I	be selected
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	y gps1 (3) Extended_gps1_gps1.i	init	Fdir1.mode
	<pre>errorSubcomponent (2) gpsError1.Implementation</pre>	acquisition	gps1.gps.mode
	gps Extended_gps1_gps_gpsDevice1.i	offMode	gps1.mode
	mission Extended_mission_nission1.i	ground	mission.mode
			mode
	Transitions		
	✓ offMode -[_errorSubcomponent.#hot_fault when _errorState = _ok]-> offMode;		
	S offMode -[powerOffwhen_errorState = _transient_failure]-> offMode;		
	X offMode - [powerOn when _errorState = _po_more_error]+> onMode;		
	<pre></pre>		
	✔ offMode -[powerOn when _errorState = _ok]-> onMode;		
	68-4ode -[powerOff-when_errorState = _ok]-> offMode;		
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Simulation guided by transitions

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	Timed T	ransitions	Step1	Step2		Name
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	Name: .*mode	Stored: No Filter V]

Model checking

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Model Properties Mission TFPG Validation Correctness Performability	Safety FDIR				
Properties	Model Deadlock Model Zeno Time				
me S Formula	Simulation Checking Checking Analysis Divergence				
Correctness The atomic proposition not dpu.failure always holds.	roposition not dpu,Failure always holds.				
	> Model Checker Options:				
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Selection of a					
properties					

Model checking

+ 👳	COMPASS Toolset	© © ©
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Properties	Model Deadlock Model Zeno Time	
Name MC Formula	Simulation Checking Analysis Divergence	
Correctness 🚯 The atomic proposition not dpu.failure always holds.	 Run Model Checking Model extended by Fault Injections Model Checker Ontion The property is true up to bound 10 The LTL property: G not dpu. failure has been found true up to bound 10. 	28
	The property is proved o	orrect

Time divergence analysis

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- Non		Run Time Divergence SAT Bound: 10	Model extended by Fault Injections
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		• No Results to show. There are no results to show at the moment.	s incorrect

Generation of Fault Trees

Generation Timed Failure Propagation Graphs

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The HASDEL Toolset

Distribution

- Freely available for ESA member states
- Released under variant of GPL (GNU Public License) restriction to ESA member states + some back-ends released under FBK's Additional Components License
- Needs ESA approval for export outside ESA member states

http://compass.informatik.rwth-aachen.de

Conclusion

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Some improvements still needed for deployment

- Semantics of some language constructs
- Link with SysML tool
- Improve performances on the analysis tools

But HASDEL could bring great benefits

- It allows early RAMS analyses before the actual development
- RAMS analyses are automated

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Thank you for your attention Any question ?

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