Speaker
Description
The anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests carried out by China, the United States and India in 2007, 2008 and 2019 respectively shooting down own satellites with direct ascent interceptors demonstrated the intrinsic capabilities of exoatmospheric kinetic interceptors as ASAT weapons. In the case of United States and India, the genuine defensive nature of their ballistic missile defences (BMD) using exoatmospheric capabilities conceived to intercept strategic ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase has highlighted their obvious offensive, and therefore, double nature to engage satellites. It happens furthermore that intercepting a satellite is simpler than a ballistic missile due to the orbital predictability of the former and the use of countermeasures by the latter.
The use of exoatmospheric kinetic interceptors does not contravene the provisions stipulated in the space law because Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass destruction, but does not ban the use of conventional weapons, including the exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKV) launched both from ground-based and space-based platforms. Since space weaponization is currently in the theoretical field, the true threat to security, sustainability and environment in outer space is the use of EKV embedded into ground-based BMD capable of creating huge clouds of space debris.
The 21st century has witnessed the increase of states with exoatmospheric BMD. Up to five countries: The United States, Russia, China, India and Israel have been expanding their strategic capabilities by developing EKV capable of reaching altitudes in low Earth Orbits (LEO) through which important and critical satellite constellations orbit, including National Technical Means of verification.
A ban on BMD turns out inconceivable to the extent that the great powers consider ground-based BMD as central elements of their national security and proof of this are the heavy investments that they have been carrying out to cope with the proliferation of ballistic missile. While a ban on EKV is unreal, a set of restrictions on their performance – preferably embodied in the form of an international treaty rather than a code of conduct – both to ensure space security and to avoid an ASAT test race may be more convincing. Such restrictions should be focused on four issues:
1) Maximum altitude at 400 kilometres during the exoatmospheric tests to avoid jeopardizing critical orbits and to ensure that the atmospheric drag can activate its force to allow a faster debris de-orbiting:
2) Limitation of 3 km/s in the burnout velocity of EKV to guarantee a maximum altitude of 600 kilometres, as otherwise a higher velocity is only possible in a post-propulsion interception phase and such a scenario is not possible because of the immaturity of the BMD technology;
3) Pre-launch warnings during the tests in order to streamline space traffic management, including ISS and manned suborbital flights;
4) Creation of a Space Inspection Agency to enforce verification and compliance measures on technical restrictions.
